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We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-
bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that 
under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may 
lead to inefficient procrastination of socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but 
yield long-term benefits. However, procrastination is often not indefinite even as we consider 
an infinite-horizon game. There exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and in 
many cases carried out to completion in finite time. When the net social benefit is large, there 
is no procrastination problem. When the  net social benefit is small, the policy can be 
procrastinated indefinitely, though there  may co-exist some gradual implementation 
equilibria. When the net social benefit is intermediate in magnitude, there are all sorts of 
procrastination equilibria, including  gradual implementation. The theory predicts that a 
government with a more strongly predominant party tends to procrastinate less. 
JEL-Code: C700, D780, D600. 
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People often procrastinate about doing things that yield long-lasting beneﬁts but carry an
upfront cost, to the detriment of their long-term interests. Quitting bad habits, such as
smoking and drinking, is one prominent example. Other examples include house-cleaning,
studying for an examination, and writing a referee report. A recent literature (e.g., Akerlof,
1991 and O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) explains this phenomenon by focusing on the ex-
istence of present-biased preferences. A present-biased individual’s relative preference for
payoﬀ at an earlier date over that of a later date gets stronger as these dates approach.
These preferences are time-inconsistent, as a cost that appeared to be small yesterday from
a present-discount perspective looms large today, while the future beneﬁts appear to be
about the same. As a result, a task that appeared to be worth doing today when evaluated
as of yesterday becomes unworthy of doing when today arrives, leading to repeated delay.
A present-biased individual who is (partially) naive to her own time-inconsistency may pro-
crastinate about completing a task forever, even though it is in her best long-term interest
to complete the task immediately.
Similarly, it is often observed that politicians procrastinate about implementing socially
beneﬁcial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-lasting beneﬁts. For example, it is
widely believed that the federal government and local governments of the U.S. underinvest
in public infrastructure: many bridges need to be repaired, and many stretches of highway
need to be renovated. The burst of the dyke in New Orleans in 2005 as a result of hurricane
Katrina is a case in point. The public was aware of the potential risk of not strengthening
the dyke, and it was clearly a socially beneﬁcial project, yet the government did not act for
many years. Another example is that politicians are reluctant to raise income taxes even
though it may beneﬁt citizens in the long-run by helping to reduce the government deﬁcit
and hence lower the long-term interest rate. The delay of trade liberalization, despite its
long-term beneﬁts to the country as a whole, can be explained by the fact that the costs
of resource reallocation (such as unemployment of workers) are incurred immediately while
social beneﬁts (of lower prices of imported goods for domestic consumers) are spread far into
1the future. Yet another prominent example of government procrastination is that of pension
reform. As Feldstein (2005) states, “[m]any economists and policy analysts acknowledge the
long-run advantages of shifting from a pay-as-you go [tax-ﬁnanced] system to a mixed system
[that combines pay-as-you-go beneﬁts with investment-based personal retirement account]
but believe that the transition involves unacceptable costs. This is often summarized by
saying that the transition generation would have to pay ‘double’ – once to ﬁnance the
social security beneﬁts of current retirees and again to save for its own retirement.” This
might explain why many countries delay pension reform.
In this paper, we provide a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence
of present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty inherent in a two-party political sys-
tem. We assume that a party has the same time preferences as a typical citizen – which
is characterized by geometric discounting – if the party believes it will be in oﬃce in every
future period. Its discount factor between any two consecutive periods is constant, and its
utility function does not give rise to time-inconsistency.1 However, under a two-party po-
litical system, the ruling party becomes present-biased and time-inconsistent. Present-bias
arises because a party’s probability of getting elected in the future is less than one, and
because it puts more weight on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁt resulting from the policy when
it is in oﬃce than when it is out of oﬃce. As a result, the ruling party in a two-party
system often procrastinate about implementing socially beneﬁcial policies that carry upfront
costs but yield long-term beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we consider a divisible policy with a positive
present discounted value (pdv) of net social beneﬁts, and demonstrate that, depending on
the cost of the policy relative to the pdv of future beneﬁts, the government may (i) imple-
ment the policy immediately, exactly in accordance with citizens’ interests, (ii) procrastinate
somewhat, but still implement the policy to completion in ﬁnite time, (iii) implement the
policy gradually over many periods, with the process continuing indeﬁn i t e l y ,o r( i v )f a i lt o
implement any part of the policy.
In a multi-party political system, the policy implementation game that determines when
1By making this assumption, we rule out government procrastination resulting from diﬀerences in the
discount factor between the political parties and the citizenry or among the political parties themselves.
2a socially beneﬁcial policy is implemented diﬀers in one fundamental way from a game
between the present self and the future selves that determines when a task is carried out.
The multi-party policy implementation game is played by the current ruling party against
its own future selves as well as the future selves of the rival parties. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd
that there are features of the equilibria that resemble those of a game played by a present
self against her own future selves. When the parties are symmetric, we can even interpret
the political game as one played by a party’s present self against its own future selves.
Indeﬁnite procrastination of socially beneﬁcial policies can sometimes be explained by
a model of myopic government who cares more about current constituents and discounts
heavily future unborn generations. That is, the government discounts future more heavily
than the typical citizen but they both remain time-consistent. In this kind of setting, the
government has incentives to procrastinate about implementing a socially beneﬁcial policy
indeﬁnitely if and only if the government discounts future suﬃciently heavier than the citi-
zens. Since the government remains time-consistent, the policy is either implemented in its
entirety immediately or procrastinated indeﬁnitely depending on the government’s discount
factor. Thus, such models cannot explain why governments sometimes implement a policy
only gradually. On the contrary, ours is not a model of myopia. Instead, it is a model of
endogenous time-inconsistency of the political parties. A present-biased ruling party may
not want to implement the policy now, but may wish a future ruling party would implement
the policy; such time-inconsistency never occurs for myopic governments. The outcome of
the model is also diﬀerent from that of myopic government in that there exist equilibria in
which, despite certain degree of procrastination, a socially beneﬁcial policy is implemented
and carried out to completion in ﬁnite time even as we consider an inﬁnite-horizon game.
Thus, our analysis reveals the distinction between two sources of procrastination by govern-
ments. The ﬁrst arises from the government being more impatient than the citizens, i.e. a
myopic government. The second arises from present-bias as political parties face uncertainty
about the prospect of being elected and put more weight on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁt
when they are in oﬃce. In this paper, we focus on the second source, which is the more
3interesting one.
We shall assume that it is feasible for a policy to be partially implemented by a gov-
ernment. For example, a government can choose to partially liberalize the trade regime
by cutting only some tariﬀs, or lowering tariﬀs somewhat but not all the way to free-trade
level. In the case of balancing the budget, a government can choose to reduce the deﬁcit
somewhat but not all the way to a balanced budget. Our analysis shows that the possibility
of partially implementing the policy enables the government to bypass the fate of indeﬁnite
procrastination of the policy even when the net social beneﬁti ss m a l l . S e e ni nt h i sl i g h t ,
this paper identiﬁes a new source of gradualism in the literature on dynamic contribution
to a public good, namely the present-bias of ruling parties inherent in a two-party political
system.2
Our paper is related to the work of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Amador (2003).
In their studies of government debt, they argue that the government saves too little, or
accumulates too much debt, due to the political uncertainty caused by the two-party system.
Amador (2003) observes that the time-inconsistency with which the government is faced is
equivalent to the problem faced by a present-biased consumer. In contrast, our paper explains
the mechanism through which a ruling party comes to have present-biased preferences in
a two-party political system and how this aﬀects the dynamic ineﬃciency of the policy
implementation of the government as one entity. To make the model as general as possible,
we have introduced asymmetries in our model: everything else being equal, the parties have
asymmetric probabilities of being elected; moreover, the same party has diﬀerent probabilities
of being elected when it is an incumbent as opposed to being a non-incumbent.3 Finally,
2Compte and Jehiel (2004), for example, obtain endogenous gradualism in a contribution game by assum-
ing that raising a player’s contribution in the negotiation phase increases the other player’s outside option
value. Each player gradually makes contributions to prevent their respective partner from terminating the
game.
3In our model, the election outcome is characterized by a Markov process, such that the current ruling
party will be re-elected with an exogensous probability between 0 and 1. Moreover, that probability can
be diﬀerent for the two parties. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Amador (2003), however, assume that
every party has an equal probability of being elected in every election. That is a special case of ours, when
the probability of being re-elected equals one half for both parties. Although Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
mention in a footnote of their paper that the analysis can be extended to a similar framework to ours, they
have not explored how the likelihood of being re-elected aﬀects the government present-bias as much as we
do in this paper.
4instead of applying the model to a speciﬁc policy issue, we analyze a more general setting,
which can be further reﬁned for analyzing speciﬁc policy issues.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) explain the delay in ﬁscal stabilization by a game of war of
attrition between two heterogeneous socio-economic groups with conﬂicting distributional
objectives. Stabilization is delayed because there is a stalemate in which the groups try
to shift the burden of the policy change onto each other. The game in the present paper
can be viewed partly as a game of war of attrition between the two parties. Each party
is relunctant to preside over the initial adjustment period (when the cost of the policy is
paid), which citizens dislike. So, each ruling party has incentives to procrastinate, hoping
that the other party would implement in the future. As a result, the socially beneﬁcial
policy is implemented immediately only if the cost is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, there is
always some form of procrastination. Procrastination can take the form of one party always
procrastinating when in oﬃce while the other always implementing when in oﬃce, or each
party implementing a fraction of the remainder of the policy when in oﬃce (if the cost is
intermediate), or both parties always procrastinating when in oﬃce (if the cost is high).
Our diﬀerence with Alesina and Drazen (1991) is that there is no need for the two parties
to be heterogeneous in any way for procrastination to occur in equilibrium. The above
procrastination equilibria exist even when the two parties are perfectly symmetric.
There is one form of procrastination in this model that is not related to war of attrition,
but purely the consequence of the present-bias of the parties. It is an equilibrium in which
each party, when in oﬃce, implements a fraction of the remainder of the policy. As a result,
the policy is implemented gradually. The motivation of this form of procrastination is not
to shift the burden of the cost of the policy, but to be able to sustain a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which all future ruling parties have incentive to implement a fraction of the
remainder of the policy. Knowing this, the current ruling party has an incentive to implement
a fraction of the remainder of the policy today, even though the party’s present discounted
utility derived from its own action is negative. This type of equilibrium exists because the
current ruling party obtains positive welfare if the policy is implemented some date in the
5future, but it obtains negative welfare if it implements today.
Our theory predicts that a government with a more predominant party tends to pro-
crastinate less. Thus a government with a overwhelming majority party tends to implement
socially desirable reforms more quickly. It also predicts that the predominant party procrasti-
nates less than the predominated party, or that the party that perceives itself to predominate
in the future tends to procrastinate less than the one that perceives itself to be predomi-
nated in the future. Finally, it predicts that socially desirable policies are often implemented
gradually, especially when no party clearly predominate the other. These are all testable
hypotheses.
The setup of our model is somewhat similar to that of the political switching model of
Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) though theirs is a more nuanced Markov process. Besley and
Coate (1998), Hassler, Krusell, Storlesletten and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008), Azzimonti (2005), Bai and Lagunoﬀ (2008), and the recent literature on endoge-
nous voting franchise (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)) all look at how
dynamic inconsistencies can arise from change in political power. Unlike the current paper,
the present-bias in these papers arises because changes in the governments action inﬂuence
the type and degree of political uncertainty. In other words, the dynamic inconsistency is
endogenous. Many of the papers on endogenous voting franchise use some form of dynamic
inconsistency to yield results on the timing and/or degree of gradualism of reform, just as in
the present paper. Endogenous time-inconsistency in government’s decisions is not new. But
what distinguishes the present paper from the rest of the literature is the existence of grad-
ual reform resulting from political uncertainty, either as a consequence of a non-cooperative
equilibruim or a cooperative equilibrium.
I ns e c t i o n2 ,w el a yd o w nt h eb a s i ca s s u m p t i ons and setup of the model. We consider a
socially beneﬁcial policy that carries an upfront cost and yields long-lasting ﬂows of beneﬁts.
Given that two parties compete for oﬃce in each period, the party currently in oﬃce plays
a game with all future ruling parties (including its future selves) in choosing the fraction
of the policy to be implemented today. In section 3, we explain why there is incentive for
6a ruling party to procrastinate. In section 4, we compute the subgame perfect equilibria
corresponding to diﬀerent implementation costs. In section 5, we summarize the results and
conclude.
2 Preliminaries
There are two political parties,  and , that seek control of the government. One of them
is in oﬃce in period  ∈ {012···}. Let each period be a term. Each party discounts future
with a discount factor  ∈ (01), which is the same as the discount factor of a representative
citizen.
The selection of the party in oﬃce in each election is characterized by a Markov process,
such that the probability that a party is elected in an election is dependent only on who is
currently in oﬃce. Speciﬁcally, the probability that party A is re-elected in the next election
if it is currently in oﬃce is , while the probability that party B is re-elected if it is currently
in oﬃce is . Since there are only two parties, the probability that one party wins is equal to
the probability that the other party loses. Therefore,  and  are the only two parameters
needed to fully describe the Markov process. We shall analyze this Markov process in detail
in the next section. We have assumed for simplicity that the probability that a party is
elected is independent of how the policy is implemented by the party or its rival. This is
clearly a limitation. But this assumption allows us to focus on the issue of interest and to
present our main ﬁndings transparently. Moreover, it enables us to conduct a simple analysis
concerning how party predominance aﬀects the policy implementation outcome when such
predominance is exogenously given.4
The policy that we consider is about implementing a policy that involves an immediate
implementation cost of  but generates a constant beneﬁt ﬂow of 1 in the current period
and every future period. We assume that the policy is divisible in the sense that a ruling
party can choose to implement only a fraction of the policy in its term so that a fraction
4It is often the case that party predominance is quite exogenous for historical reasons. Examples are the
Liberal Democratic Party in post-war Japan, the People’s Action Party in post-independence Singapore,
and the Congress Party in post-independence India.
7 of the policy undertaken in period  poses an upfront cost  to society while generating
beneﬁt ﬂows of  in each future period. We assume that 1(1 − )  , so the policy is
worth implementing from the citizens’ point of view.
The ﬂow of utility enjoyed by citizens in period  is assumed to be equal to the ﬂow of





The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side shows the ﬂow of beneﬁtt h a ts o c i e t ye n j o y si np e r i o d
 from the fraction of the policy that has been implemented, whereas the second term repre-
sents the ﬂow of cost that society incurs from the part of the policy implemented in period






We assume that the party in oﬃce in period  places a (normalized)w e i g h to fo n eo nt h e
ﬂow of net social beneﬁti np e r i o d,a n ds oi t sﬂow of utility in period  equals , while
the opposition party puts a weight of  ∈ [01] on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁti nt h es a m e
period.5 In other words, a party puts more weight on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁtw h e ni t
is in power than when it is not. This diﬀerential weighting is motivated by the presumption
that the ruling party’s welfare function is a weighted sum of the citizens’s welfare and its
own welfare ( is the weight put on social welfare and 1− is the weight put on the party’s
welfare). We suppose the ruling party derives some ﬂow of private beneﬁts (costs) spilled
over from a positive (negative) ﬂow of net social beneﬁt during its term. Moreover, the
ﬂow of private beneﬁts, which can be negative, is assumed to be proportional to the ﬂow
of net social beneﬁt. For example, when the ruling party presides over a larger positive
(negative) ﬂow of net social beneﬁt, citizens are better (worse) oﬀ, and are therefore more
(less) willing to accommodate higher government spending during its term. This in turn
increases (decreases) the amount of resources available to the ruling party to pursue its own
5The model can easily be accommodated to the case where the parties have diﬀerent values of .W e
assume that they have the same value of  only to simplify the exposition.
8agenda during that period.6
Let 
 denote the probability that party  currently in oﬃce will also be in oﬃce  periods
later, and consider the case in which the ﬂow of net social beneﬁt + in every future period
 +  does not depend on which party is in oﬃce in period  + . Then, it follows from our


















This can be interpreted as saying that the utility ﬂo wa c c r u e dt or u l i n gp a r t y is equal
to the ﬂow of utility to the citizens in each period, but the party’s discount factor diﬀers
from that of the citizens in each period because of political uncertainty and selﬁshness of the
party, as discussed above. Recall that  is the probability that party  is re-elected when it
is currently in oﬃce. Deﬁne  ≡  + . Clearly,  ∈ (02). Henceforth, we shall assume
that 1 2, which correponds to the existence of an incumbent advantage in election.
F o rc o n c r e t e n e s s ,l e tu ss u p p o s ef o rn o wt h a tp a r t y is in oﬃce in the current period.
We derive below the probability that the current ruling party will also be in oﬃce  periods
later and show that it converges to a steady state probability as  becomes large. First, note
that the probability that party  will be in oﬃce  + 1 periods later can be linked to the










=( 1 − 








(1 − )+( 1− )( − 1)
2 − 
 (2)
6Another way to motivate why a party puts more weight on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁtw h e ni no ﬃce
is that the ruling party not only cares about the ﬂow of net social beneﬁt as a typical citizen, but it also
cares more about it because delivering a larger ﬂow of net social beneﬁt while in oﬃce enhances its political
status. On the contrary, while the opposition party cares about the ﬂow of net social beneﬁta sat y p i c a l
citizen, it cares less about it because it treats the success of the ruling party as unfavorable, as it undermines
its political status.
9Deﬁne  ≡ lim→∞
. Then, it is clear that  =
−(−1)





 +( 1− 
)( − 1)







 for  ≥ 0 (4)
As we see from (3) and (4) (together with 0 2) that 
 and 
 approach  and
1 − , respectively, as  becomes large. That is,  is the steady state probability that
party  is in oﬃce. Without loss of generality, we assume that   12, or equivalently
  . That is, we assume that party  is a predominant party.
As we see from (3), when viewed from date  = 0, the probability that party  is in oﬃce
decreases over time from 
0 = 1 and converges to . Incumbent  has an advantage in the
next election, but this advantage diminishes the further it is from  =0 . T h ec a s ew h e r e
party  is currently in oﬃce is similar; when viewed from date  = 0, the probability that
party  is in oﬃce decreases over time from 
0 =1t o1− .


















{ +( 1− )[
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
]} (5)
3 Temptation to Procrastinate
In this section we try to gain some intuition about the decision-making of the ruling parties.
It has been shown in the literature that an individual with a present-biased utility function
exhibits time-inconsistent behavior, which includes ineﬃcient procrastination of beneﬁcial
tasks that carry upfront costs but generate long-lasting future streams of beneﬁts (see, for
example, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). In the current setting, the ruling party prefers the
other party, when in oﬃce, to implement the policy and bear the upfront implementation
cost. The policy implementation game is a war of attrition; each party has an incentive to
10wait, hoping that the other party would concede (i.e. implement and bear the policy cost).
As a consequence, the party in oﬃce will have a present-biased utility function. Therefore,
it is also faced with a time-inconsistency problem, and we expect that it may procrastinate.
Our analysis shows that procrastination occurs under certain conditions, and the problem
gets worse as implementation cost gets higher. However, even when it does happen, procras-
tination needs not be indeﬁnite even as we consider an inﬁnite-horizon game. Although the
government sometimes procrastinates implementing socially beneﬁcial policies, there exist
equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and may be carried out to completion in ﬁnite
time, especially when the cost is low. Speciﬁcally, we show that (i) the policy is entirely
implemented immediately in period 0 if the cost of the policy is small; (ii) there may be
some ﬁnite delay in implementing the policy or the policy is implemented gradually over
many periods of time if the cost is in the intermediate range; and (iii) if the cost is high,
the policy may never be implemented, but there may also co-exist other equilibria in which
the policy is implemented gradually. The equilibrium with gradual policy implementation
when the policy implementation cost is high exists precisely because the party in oﬃce has
present-bias.
We shall show that there is a temptation for the current ruling party to procrastinate due
to its present-bias. Suppose we ignore for now the divisibility of the policy. The expected
present discounted utility of ruling party  (evaluated at  = 0) based on the anticipation that
the entire policy is implemented by whoever is in oﬃce (not necessarily party )  periods











Therefore, ruling party  at period 0 (weakly) prefers having the policy implemented in






















11The second inequality is easy to interpret: If the ruling party in period 0 knows that the
policy will be implemented by whoever is in oﬃce in period 1, it prefers to implement the
policy in its entirety immediately if and only if the reduction in beneﬁt by procrastinating,

0, is at least as high as the reduction in cost by doing so, (
0 − 




0)  (−1) for  = , both parties (whenever they are in oﬃce) want to
procrastinate. Since   12, party  has stonger incentive to procrastinate than party .
It is shown below that if both parties discount the ﬂow of net social beneﬁtw h e nt h e ya r e
out of oﬃce (i.e., 1), then procrastinating may be preferable for the ruling party since,
by doing so, the reduction in cost can outweigh the loss in beneﬁt. We start our analysis
from the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if 
0  0,t h e n
ruling party  can gain from procrastinating only if party  (6= ) always implements when
in oﬃce. In other words, provided that 
0  0, given that party  always procrastinates, the
best response of ruling party  is to always implement.
Proof. If 
0  0, then ruling party  cannot rely on its future selves to implement the
policy when in oﬃce, precisely because of time-inconsistency. When a future period comes,
even if party  is in oﬃce, it would face exactly the same situation as in period 0, and so it
w o u l dp r o c r a s t i n a t eb a s e do nt h es a m er e a s o n i n ga si np e r i o d0 .Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if 
0  0,t h e n
ruling party  always procrastinates.
Proof. Since perpetual procrastinating yields zero welfare, it is better than implement-
ing, which yields negative welfare. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if 
1  ( −
1), then ruling party  always implements regardless of party ’s implementation strategy.
Proof. A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 6 ) ,i f
1
0 = 
1  ( − 1), “always implement” is a
dynamically consistent strategy for party , given that party  always implements: Given that
12party  would implement whenever it is in oﬃce in the future, it is better oﬀ implementing
immediately if it is currently in oﬃce. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if 
1  (−1)
but 
0  0,r u l i n gp a r t y always procrastinates given that party  always implements, and
ruling party  always implements given that party  always procrastinates.
Proof. If 
1  ( − 1), then given that party  always implements when in oﬃce, it
is not optimal for party  to adopt the stationary strategy of always implementing when in
oﬃce. Therefore, the only stationary pure strategy for party  is to always procrastinate
when in oﬃce.7 Finally, if 
1  ( − 1) and 
0  0, then, from lemma 1, ruling party 
always implements given that party  always procrastinates. Q.E.D.
4 Subgame Pefect Equilibria
4.1 Non-Cooperative Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Lemmas 1 through 4 basically provide the intuition that if we consider only stationary
pure strategies and indivisible policy then party  would (1) always implement when 
1 
( − 1);( 2 )w h e n
1  ( − 1) and 
0  0, (a) always implements when party 
always procrastinates, and (b) always procrastinates when  always implements; (3) always
procrastinates when 
0  0. Recall that the welfare of ruling party  at  = 0 if it implements








0  0 ⇐⇒







Consequently, lemmas 1 through 4 boil down to the following: party  would
(1) always implement when ( − 1)  
1;
(2) when 






, (a) always implements when party  always
procrastinates; (b) always procrastinates when  always implements;
7The strategy is dynamically consistent: If the utility from procrastinating is higher than from imple-
menting today given that the calculation is based on the assumption that party  would implement in the
next period (if it is in oﬃce), then the value from procrastinating today would be even higher given that the
calculation is based on the assumption that party  procrastinates again in the next period (if in oﬃce), as
the party would face the same situation tomorrow as today.






  ( − 1).
Therefore, its implementation strategy depends on the value of ( − 1).
This subsection formally derives non-cooperative stationary subgame perfect equilib-
ria that conﬁrm the intuition behind lemmas 1 through 4. Subsection 4.2 derives a non-
cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium with gradual implementation. Subsection 4.3 ana-
lyzes the eﬀects of party predominance. Subsection 4.4 shows that even in the case where
the cost is so high that there exists no non-cooperative equilibrium with successful imple-
mentation of the policy, there may exist a “cooperative” equilibrium (with a trigger strategy
and a possible punishment strategy) in which the policy is gradually implemented.
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
We derive the condition for the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium here. A mixed-
strategy equilibrium exists when each ruling party derives positive utility from implementing
the policy in its entirety immediately but would gain from procrastinating if it knows that the
other party would implement when in oﬃce next period. In such situations, an equilibrium
exists such that all ruling parties randomize their policy decisions, and each party is made
indiﬀerent between implementing or procrastinating when in oﬃce. This corresponds to case
(2) mentioned above, namely when 












]( w h e r e 6= )a sp a r t y’s discount function  periods later




 as the welfare of party
 when party  implements the policy immediately given that  is in oﬃce at  =0 .L e t
denote the stationary probability that ruling party  implements the entire policy given that
it has not been implemented. Given that the policy has not been implemented, let   (˜  )
denote the expected welfare of party  (which may or may not be in oﬃc e )a tt h eb e g i n n i n g
of each period when party  ()w a si no ﬃce last period.


























0 +( 1− 
)˜ 
] (8)
14In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, ruling party  is indiﬀerent between implementing and
procrastinating, i.e., 




0 +  ˜ 
0
1 − (1 − )

Then, we substitute this expression and 
0 =   into (7) to obtain

 =
[ − ( − 1)(1 − )]
0 + (1 − ) ˜ 
0
1 − (1 − )
 (9)
We apply 
0 =   one more time to equation (9) to get the probability of implementation













+ 2( − 1)
 (10)
Similarly, we obtain the corresponding probability to be chosen by  to make  indiﬀerent
between implementing and procrastinating when in oﬃce:

∗ =









+ 2( − 1)

In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, ∗ is chosen by ruling party  so that party  is
indiﬀerent between implementing and procrastinating when in oﬃce. Thus, in situations
where ruling party ’s incentive to procrastinate decreases due to some parametric changes,
∗ must be increased to preserve this indiﬀerence. Consequently, if ∗ calculated in (10)
is greater than 1, ruling party  will always implement regardless of ’s implementation
strategy. On the other hand, if ∗  0, ruling party  will procrastinate regardless of the
implementation strategy of party .
Relationship Between Equilibrium Outcome and Implementation Cost
The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the parties’ implementation strategies. It is assumed
that   , i.e., party  is a predominant party. The above analysis shows that for party
 (where  =  and  6= ), when the value of ( − 1) is in the range marked by 0 
∗  1, ruling party ’s best response given ’s strategy can take any of the following three
15alternatives: (1) ruling party  randomizes if it is made indiﬀerent between implementing and
procrastinating by suitable choice of ∗ ∈ (01) by , (2) ruling party  always implements
the policy if party  always procrastinates when in oﬃce, and (3) ruling party  always
procrastinates if  always implements when in oﬃce. Knowing these strategies, we can
delineate the equilibria according to the value of (−1) as follow. (The delineation of the
equilibria is shown in the lower panel of Figure 1.) There are ﬁve types of equilibria:
(i) When (−1)  
1 for  = , there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium
in which A and B both implement;
(ii) when 
1  ( − 1)  
1 , there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium in
which A implements and B procrastinates;
(iii) when 






 , there are multiple stationary equilibria –
there are at least three equilibria: (a) both randomize, (b) A implements and B procrasti-













 , there is a unique (stationary)







  ( − 1), there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equi-
librium in which both procrastinate.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the implementation cost of the policy is small, the policy is immediately
implemented despite the fact that both parties are present-biased. If the cost is high, nei-
ther party implements the policy. If the cost is in the intermediate range, some delay in
implementation is expected. The delay may arise because one of the two parties always pro-
crastinates when in oﬃce, or because both parties mix their decision as to whether or not
they implement the policy when they are in oﬃce.
To demonstrate that the range of ( − 1) indicated in Equilibrium Type (iii) above
indeed supports multiple equilibria, it proves useful to specialize to  =1a n d = 0, i.e.
there exists neither incumbent advantage nor disadvantage, and the parties do not care about
social welfare when they are not in oﬃce. This helps to simplify the exposition without losing
16generality.
Specialization to  =1and  =0
In this case, we have 
 =1− 
 =  and 
 =1− 
 =1−  for  ≥ 1. Therefore,












We substitute the above equations and  =1a n d = 0 into (10) to obtain

∗ =
 − (1 − )( − 1)
(1 − )( − 1)
 (13)
It is readily veriﬁed that ∗ increases if  decreases or  increases. It is necessary for ∗
to increase to reduce ruling party ’s incentive to implement the policy when either one of
these pro-implementation forces strengthens.
Delineation of Equilibria when  =1and  =0
In the discussion above, we note that if ∗ is calculated from (10) and if 
0 =  
is assumed, then ∗  1s i g n i ﬁes that party A always implements regardless of party B’s
implementation strategy, and ∗  0s i g n i ﬁes that party A always procrastinates regardless
of party B’s strategy. Now, we derive the conditions under which ∗  1a n d∗  0,
respectively. It follows directly from (13) that ∗  1i se q u i v a l e n tt o







)( − 1) (14)







Under this circumstance, according to lemma 3, ruling party  always implements regardless
of party ’s implementation strategy, which means that 
0   even when ∗ =1 . 8
8To proof this, note that when ∗ =1 ,w eh a v ef r o m( 9 )t h a t  = 
0 +( 1− ) ˜ 
0 .U s i n gt h i s
equality, and equations (11) and (12), we obtain   = 
³








1− so that   −
0 =
(1 − )( − 1). Therefore, the right hand side of (14) is equal to (  − 
0 )(1 − ). Note that the left
hand side of (14) is equal to 
0 from (11). Therefore, (14) is equivalent to 
0  (  − 
0 )(1 − ),
which is equivalent to 
0  . Hence, (15) is equivalent to saying that 
0   at ∗ =1 .
17On the other hand, it follows from (13) that ∗  0i se q u i v a l e n tt o




which is equivalent to 
0  0, i.e. implementing the policy confers negative welfare on





1 − (1 − )
 (16)
Under this circumstance, ruling party  procrastinates regardless of party ’s implementa-
tion strategy.
We can conduct a similar analysis for ruling party  and obtain

∗ =
(1 − ) − (1 − )( − 1)
( − 1)














1 −  
which is equivalent to 
0  0.
The delineation of equilibria under the special case  =1a n d = 0 is shown in the lower
panel of Figure 1.
4.2 Non-cooperative Equilibrium With Gradual Implementation
The existence of mixed strategy equilibrium leads us to suspect that if the policy is divis-
ible then each party may be willing to implement a fraction of the policy when in oﬃce
given that the other does the same. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium with gradual imple-
mentation of the policy if the implementation cost is in the intermediate range where the
mixed-strategy equilibrium exists [Type (iii) in subsection 4.1 and in Figure 1]. This “grad-
ual implementation equilibrium” has a one-to-one correspondence with the mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
18Let us consider a stationary strategy proﬁle such that whenever party  is in oﬃce, it
implements a fraction  of the remainder of the policy of size  ∈ (01]. Then, ruling party
’s expected welfare when  was in oﬃce in the last period and that when  was in oﬃce


























0 + ˜ 
((1 − 
))]
Let us guess that  ()a n d˜  () are linear such that  ()= and ˜  ()=˜ 
where  and ˜  are time-invariant. Then, these equations can be rewritten as

























0 +( 1− 
)˜ 
] (18)
It is immediate that (17) and (18) correspond term by term to (7) and (8), respectively.
Again, focusing on the case in which  =1a n d = 0, we know from the analysis of the
mixed-strategy equilibrium that if

 =





 − (1 − )( − 1)
(1 − )( − 1)

then both parties are indiﬀerent between implementing and procrastinating, and hence it
is ruling party ’s best response that it implements the fraction  of the remainder of the
policy. It can also be easily veriﬁed that   and ˜   are indeed linear functions of  as we
have guessed. We record this ﬁnding in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the cost of the policy is in the intermediate range where the mixed-strategy
equilibrium exists, there also co-exists an equilibrium in which the policy is gradually imple-
mented. Each party implements a constant fraction of the remainder of the policy when in
oﬃce in such a way that the other party is indiﬀerent between implementing and procrsti-
nating when in oﬃce.
194.3 The Eﬀects of Party Predominance
Without loss of generality, we continue to assume that  =1a n d = 0 to simplify exposition.
As mentioned earlier, equilibria as depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1 will arise when
party  is strictly predominant (  12). If both parties are perfectly symmetrical (i.e.,
 =1 2), then the threshold implementation costs that demarcate the diﬀerent equilibria
are the same for the two parties: 2a n d(2−) as indicated in Figure 2. The analysis is
t h es a m ea si nt h ea s y m m e t r i cc a s ee x c e p tt h a ti ti ss i m p l e r .S o ,w ed on o tb o t h e rt or e p e a t
it. Consequently, under symmetry, there are only three equilibrium outcomes corresponding
to the diﬀerent values of (−1) :( i )w h e n( −1)  2, both parties implement when in
oﬃce; (ii) when 2  (−1)  (2−) there are multiple equilibria including (a) a mixed
strategy equilibrium similar to the asymmetric case, (b)  implements and  procrastinates,
and (c)  implements and  procrastinates; (iii) when (2 − )  ( − 1), both parties
procrastinate. As we depart from symmetry and let party  become predominant, i.e. let
 increases from 12, both threshold implementation costs increase for party  while they
decrease for party  (so a situation illustrated in the lower panel of Figures 2 arises) so that
the range of (−1) that supports multiple equilibria shrinks, as shown in Figure 2. If the












then  exceeds (1 − )(1 − ). In this case, the size of the range of ( − 1) that
supports multiple equilibria shrinks to zero, and so the multiple equilibria shown in Figure
1 will disappear.
Party ’s predominance increases the chance of policy implementation if the original
symmetric equilibrium is characterized by procrastination of the predominated party or
both, for example when implementation cost is relatively high so that ( − 1) is greater
than (2−). In this case, both parties procrastinate when in oﬃce if they are symmetrical,
but ruling party  will implement the policy (while ruling party  still procrastinates) if
it becomes suﬃciently predominant. This is because the range of ( − 1) that supports
20Equilibrium Type (iv) expands at the expense of that of Equilibrium Type (v) (and Type (iii)
for that matter). On the contrary, party ’s predominance may hinder policy implementation
if the implementation cost is relatively small so that the original symmetric equilibrium is
characterized by immediate implementation by whoever is in oﬃce. The explanation is the
following. When ( − 1) is smaller than 2, the policy is implemented immediately if
the two parties are symmetrical. As party  becomes suﬃcient predominant, however, the
policy is implemented only when party  is in oﬃce because the range of ( − 1) that
supports Equilibrium Type (ii) expands at the expense of that of Equilibrium Type (i) (and
Type (iii) for that matter). Thus, party ’s predominance causes a possible implementation
delay in this case.
Now refer to the asymmetric case shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. In the equilibrium
where ruling party  implements while ruling party  procrastinates [i.e. (ii) and (iii b) and
(iv)], the probability that the policy is implemented in each period conditional on the event
that the policy has not been implemented (or “hazard rate”) equals ,w h i c hi sg r e a t e rt h a n
12. This hazard rate of implementation increases as party  becomes more predominant.9




∗ +( 1− 
)
∗ =
 − 2(1 − )( − 1)
( − 1)
in each period. In this case, the hazard rate of implementation does not depend on party
’s degree of predominance; an increase in  leads to an increase in ∗ and a decrease in
∗ so that parties  and  are kept indiﬀerent between implementing and procrastinating
when in oﬃce. This hazard rate of implementation, however, increases if  increases or 
decreases.10
We summarize the above discussion by the following proposition.
9Party ’s predominance, however, lowers the probability of policy implementation in the equilibrium
where party  always procrastinates when in oﬃce while party  always implements when in oﬃce (in
equilibrium (iii c)). The hazard rate of implementation in each period is 1−, which is less than 1/2, and
it decreases as party  becomes more predominant. This is admittedly a perverse outcome, but it does not
aﬀect the broad picture that the unconditional probability (on ) of procrastination decreases with party
predominance.
10Note that this result needs to be modiﬁed when 1.
21Proposition 3 For a given value of (−1), if the original equilibrium is characterized by
procrastination of the predominated party or both parties, an increase in party predominance
increases the hazard rate of implementation. But if the original equilibrium is characterized
by immediate implementation by both parties, an increase in party predominance can lead to
procrastination.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is intuitive, given that the source of procrastination
is political uncertainty. As party predominance increases, political uncertainty decreases,
which should lead to less procrastination. However, the second part of proposition is counter-
intuitive, as less political uncertainty can actually lead to more procrastination.
4.4 Cooperative Equilibrium with Gradual Policy Implementation
We have shown that if the implementation cost is large enough, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which neither party implements the policy. In this case, we have

0  0 (see (16) for the case where  =1 ) ,f o r = , so that each ruling party would
obtain negative utility from implementing any positive fraction of the policy. Nevertheless,
each ruling party wishes that the policy be implemented sometime in the future since 
 is















In an appendix that is available upon request, we show that the behavior of present-biased
preferences is very similar to that of geometric discounting far oﬀ in the future, i.e., 
+1








as  gets larger and larger, and hence the expression in square brackets on the right-hand
side of (19) converges to
P∞
=0  −  as  tends to inﬁnity. Since
P∞
=0  − 0u n d e rt h e








 0a s exceeds a certain
level. This contrasts sharply with the case of myopia. If the ruling parties are simply myopic
(heavily discounting the future with geometric discounting), no ruling party wishes that the
policy be implemented in the future if it would obtain negative utility from implementing
22today. Time inconsistency arises precisely because the parties are present-biased when they
are in oﬃce.
It follows from 
0  0 that if the ruling party expects all future ruling parties to refrain
from implementing the policy, it should also stay away from the policy. That is, no ruling
party wants to be the last to implement a positive fraction of the policy. The strategy proﬁle
in which  =0f o ra n y is a subgame perfect equilibrium as we have seen. This is certainly
bad news for the citizens. Although the policy is socially beneﬁcial, there is a possibility of
indeﬁnite procrastination. Does there exist any subgame perfect equilibrium in which some
future ruling parties at least implement part of the policy?
To answer this question, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tn or u l i n gp a r t yw o u l dw a n tt oi m p l e m e n tt h e
policy to completion since it would bear a utility loss from implementing the last part of it.
Therefore, if the policy is indivisible, then the policy will never be implemented. Thus, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the cost of the policy is so high that 
0  0,f o r = , and if the policy
is not divisible, then the policy never gets implemented even though it is socially beneﬁcial.
The proposition says that in case partial implementation of the policy is not feasible, there
is indeﬁnite procrastination if the net social beneﬁt is too small.
Indeed, as shown below, if the policy is to be implemented at all, it must be implemented
gradually to assure non-negative welfare for every ruling party in the future. Moreover, the
policy implementation process must continue indeﬁnitely; otherwise, the ruling party that
implements the policy to completion would suﬀer welfare loss from the part of the policy it
implements. The following analysis presents such a gradual implementation equilibrium.
We shall show that when 




  0 for any  = , i.e., the simple sum of all current and future utility ﬂows is
positive for both parties. The situation in which
P∞
=0 
  0a r i s e si f is relatively small
in the high-cost range. The following lemma implies that 
  0f o ra l l ≥ 1w h e n takes
on a value such that 
0 = 0. This in turn implies, by continuity, that even if 




  0. This happens when  is suﬃciently small, as 
 decreases in .
23Lemma 5 If 1,t h e n
  

0 for any  ≥ 1.
The proof of Lemma 5 is relegated to the Appendix. Under the usual geometric discounting
preferences such that 
 = , 
 would be equal to 

0. Under the present-biased prefer-
ences, however, the current ruling party puts a disproportionately high weight on the cost
incurred in the current period, and so 
0 is disproportionately small.
Now, consider the stationary action proﬁle, symmetric between the two parties, such
that regardless of which party is in oﬃce,  = (1 − )
 for some constant  ∈ (01).
According to this action proﬁle, both parties implement the fraction  of the remainder of
the policy whenever they are in oﬃce, and this process continues indeﬁnitely. Consequently,













  0. Then, there exists ¯  ∈ (01) such that for any  ∈ (0¯ ),
the relevant welfaref o rt h ep a r t yi no ﬃce in period  given by (20) is positive.






  0a s → 0. Thus, there
exists an ¯  such that for any  ∈ (0¯ ),
P∞
=0(1−)





Can this gradual implementation scheme with  ∈ (0¯ ) be supported as a subgame




 if there has been no deviation from  = (1 − )
 for all  ≤  − 1
0o t h e r w i s e .
(21)
Hence, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the cost of the policy is suﬃciently high that 




  0 for  = , there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which every ruling party implements a constant fraction of the remainder of the policy so
that the implementation process goes on indeﬁnitely.
24Proof: We show here that the strategy proﬁle (21) is subgame perfect. Since indeﬁnite
procrastination is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we need only show that no ruling party
has an incentive to deviate from the prescribed actions when there has been no deviation
in the past. According to the prescribed action proﬁle, if there has been no deviation, the
ruling party in period  is to choose  = (1 − )
, receiving positive welfare from its action
(Lemma 6). If it chooses some other level of , on the other hand, the equilibrium path
would switch to the “punitive equilibrium” of indeﬁnite procrastination, making the present
v a l u eo ff u t u r eu t i l i t yﬂows zero. Since the utility ﬂow from choosing a positive  for the
ruling party in period  is negative, the discounted sum of utility ﬂows would be non-positive
if it chooses any  other than (1 − )
. Hence, the ruling party in period  is better oﬀ
conforming to the equilibrium path than choosing any other levels of . Therefore, it will
choose  = (1 − )
 if there has been no deviation before period . Q.E.D.
This cooperative equilibrium exists because both parties have preferences characterized
by present-bias. Based on the analysis in this paper, we can explain a ruling party’s possible
procrastination in two diﬀerent ways. First, it may prefer the other party to implement the
policy in the near future, rather than implementing it itself. Second, the present value of
utility ﬂows from implementing the policy may become greater if the policy is implemented
some time in the future due to present-bias. The ﬁrst one was a predominant cause of
the mixed-strategy (and non-cooperative gradual implementation) equilibrium derived in
subsection 4.1. The second one, on the other hand, is the primary cause of this cooperative
gradual implementation equilibrium. A ruling party has an incentive to implement part of
t h ep o l i c yo n l yw h e nas i g n i ﬁcant portion of the policy is suﬃciently delayed so that the
entire process of policy implementation yields a positive present value of utility ﬂows.
5 Concluding Remarks
We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of present-bias
resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. Present-bias arises
because a party’s probability of getting elected in the future is less than one, and because
25it puts more weight on the ﬂow of net social beneﬁt of the policy when it is in oﬃce than
when it is not. As a result, the ruling party in a two-party system often procrastinate
about implementing socially beneﬁcial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term
beneﬁts. Another way to look at it is that a ruling party’s implementation of the policy
today confers positive intertemporal externalities on future rival ruling parties, leading to
too little implementation.
We ﬁnd that there is an array of equilibria, which can be categorized according to the
cost-beneﬁt ratio of the policy. The procrastination problem tends to get more serious as the
cost-to-beneﬁt ratio gets higher. When the cost is relatively low, there is no procrastination
problem. When the cost is intermediate, the parties are in a war of attrition. As the ruling
party cannot capture all the future beneﬁts from implementing the policy, there is certain
degree of relunctance to implement it immediately or completely. There are various forms of
procrastination, such as having a probability of implementation less than one in each period,
or gradual implementation by all ruling parties. When the cost is relatively high, the policy
may be procrastinated indeﬁnitely, though there may co-exist equilibria in which the policy
is implemented gradually in a cooperative manner.
Our theory predicts that a government with a more predominant party tends to pro-
crastinate less. It also predicts that the predominant party procrastinates less than the
predominated party. Finally, it predicts that socially desirable policies are more likely to
be implemented gradually rather than immediately when the degree to which one party
predominates the other is lower. It would be interesting to test these hypotheses.
One can easily derive corresponding results when the government is faced with imple-
menting a policy that confers immediate beneﬁts and demands future ﬂows of costs. In this
setting, it is expected that a present-biased government may implement a policy which is
not socially beneﬁcial. For example, the ruling party may run too large a budget deﬁcit.
A possible extension of this research is to endogenize the probability of a party being
elected. In our model, citizens are far-sighted and wish that the government implement the
policy entirely as soon as possible. If this eﬀect dominates, parties would have more incentive
26to implement the policy if the probability of being re-elected is endogenized; consequently, the
equilibrium delay would be shortened. In reality, however, it is equally plausible that at least
part of the citizenry is myopic in their voting behavior so that the ruling party’s probability
of being re-elected is positively correlated with the net ﬂow of social cost resulting from
implementing the policy today. In such a case, parties may have less incentive to implement
the policy, so that the equilibrium delay may be lengthened. In any event, endogenizing
the ruling party’s probability of being re-elected would not change the basic message of this
paper.
In addition, this model can be easily applied to address speciﬁc policy issues, such as
trade liberalization, reduction of budget deﬁcit, or social security reform, by adding more
structure.
27Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5:






,f o ra n y ≥ 1a n d
















 since party ’s counterpart is obvious. Recall equation (5) and deﬁne
() ≡  +( 1− ){
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
+}
−[ +( 1− ){
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
}][ +( 1− ){
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
}]
It is easy to see that 
+  
 
 if and only if ()  0.
Now,
(0) = 
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
+ − [
 +( 1− 
)( − 1)
][





)[1 − ( − 1)
][1 − ( − 1)
]  0
since −1 − 1  1. In addition, (1) = 0. Moreover, since

00()=−2[1 − 
 − (1 − 
)( − 1)
][1 − 
 − (1 − 
)( − 1)
]  0
the function  is a concave function. Thus, we have shown that ()  0 for any  ∈ [01).
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